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THE PRICE OF POWER: SALE OF
CORPORATE CONTROL
Adolf A. Berle'
Sixteen years ago, Dean Stevens prefaced the second edition of his
classic Handbook on the Law of Private Corporations with a remark:
There is apparent, however, a slowly developing tendency in case law to
recognize and enforce the fiduciary obligation of those in control of corpo-
rate affairs toward the whole body of security holders and each class
thereof.'
He accordingly added a chapter, not found in the first edition, on "Au-
thority and Responsibility of Those Exercising Voting Control," and
stated a general rule:
A shareholder is not disqualified from voting merely because he has a per-
sonal interest in the transaction to be voted upon. But those who hold
control of the corporation owe a duty to exercise their power for the benefit
of the corporate group as a whole and not for their own interests solely.
2
He considered the rationale of the rule to be that the "scheme" of corpo-
rate management under which a majority of shareholders is vested with
power to make corporate decisions carried with it the obligation that this
power must be exercised as a whole.3 The ensuing sixteen years produced
a notable series of cases applying this principle. Included among them
are a number of decisions relating to the right of those holding control
interest to sell the stock carrying such control at a price reflecting or
including a premium over market precisely because it carried control
power with it.
This application of Stevens' doctrine reaches deep into the central
nervous system of corporate organization. That fact, as well as the com-
mercial interest involved, has, I think, been the cause of elaborate
academic writing on the subject.4 Some of the writing and cases take off
from an observation I made in 1932. At that time, the dominant stock-
holders in the Loew theatre chain arranged to sell their stock to interests
t Professor of Law, Columbia University, School of Law, New York, N.Y.
1 Stevens, Corporations at vii (2d ed. 1949).
2 Id. § 126, at 567.
3 Id. § 126, at 568.
4 See Bayne, "Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee," 53 Geo. L.J. 543 (1965); Bayne,
"A Philosophy of Corporate Control," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22 (1963); Bayne, "The Sale
of Corporate Control," 33 Fordham L. Rev. 583 (1965); Berle, "'Control' in Corporate
Law," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1958); Hill, "The Sale of Controlling Shares," 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 986 (1957); Jennings, "Trading in Corporate Control," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956);
Katz, "The Sale of Corporate Control," 38 Chi. B. Rec. 376 (1957); Leech, "Transactions
in Corporate Control," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956); Comment, "Sales of Corporate
Control and the Theory of Overkill," 31 U. Chli. L. Rev. 725 (1964).
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dominated by the late Mr. William Fox, and were paid nearly double the
current market price for their shares. A minority stockholder sued to
compel the Loew interests to pay over to the corporation the premium
over market which they had received for their stock, and on motion to
disthiss the trial court upheld the complaint.5 I argued that "the power
going with 'control' is an asset which belongs only to the corporation;
and that payment for that power, if it goes anywhere, must go into the
corporate treasury."' It was apparent that the value of control "arises
out of the ability which the holder has to dominate property which in
equity belongs to others,"7 and that the law had thus far been unable to
deal with the situation. The rationale behind the reasoning is the same
as that adopted by Dean Stevens in his statement of the rule.
Some risk is involved in adding to the spate of legal literature dealing
with the subject. It has been discussed and rediscussed. Professor W. D.
Andrews is the latest to enter the field.' He accepts the proposition-as
have most courts-that an individual or group selling stock carrying
control of a corporation and receiving a premium over market for that
stock will be required to account to the other stockholders for the
premium unless the other stockholders have been offered opportunity to
sell their holdings, in whole or pro rata with the control sellers, at an equal
price. He dismisses the theory that power is a corporate asset and that
therefore the premium belongs to the corporation. He erects a rule that:
[W]henever a controlling stockholder sells his shares, every other holder
of shares (of the same class) is entitled to have an equal opportunity to
sell his shares or a prorata part of them on substantially the same terms.
Or in terms of the correlative duty: before a controlling stockholder may
sell his shares to an outsider he must assure his fellow stockholders an equal
opportunity to sell their shares, or as high a proportion of theirs as he
ultimately sells of his own.9
As he sees it, the power over the corporation implied in the stockholder's
vote is an element of value corresponding to each share of such stock;
consequently such share is entitled to a pro rata proportion of that
element of value whenever control is transferred at a price over market.
The rule is, of course, novel; but that is not an objection. The purpose
of this essay is to analyze briefly the rationale of various approaches to
the problem of the sale of control. Specifically, our problem is to discover
5 Stanton v. Schenck, 142 Misc. 406, 252 N.Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931).
6 Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 244 (1933).
7 Ibid.
8 Andrews, "The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares," 78
Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965); see Javaras, "Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling
Shares: A Reply To Professor Andrews," 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420 (1965).
9 Andrews, supra note 8, at 515-16.
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the fundamental rule itself, and to suggest that courts may -have at their
disposition various remedies. Seen in that light, Professor Andrews'
analysis emerges not as a change in theory, but as a suggestion of one
of a number of possible remedies.
I
POWER AND CONTROL
The essence of control-a loosely used word-is power to choose the
directors and management of a corporation. Such power is not necessarily
bound to stock. Let us note its four variants:
(1) The controlling interests may hold fifty-one per cent of all voting
stock. No question here: the voting power of the stock carries with it
control.
(2) Control may be exercised by an individual or group holding less
than a majority of the stock, but a large minority block, the majority
being scattered. Such a block can ordinarily attract to itself enough addi-
tional votes to dominate a corporate election.10 The power goes not merely
with the votes of the minority block of stock but also depends on the
capacity of the control holder to add in the necessary complement.
(3) Control may be vested in a relatively small minority block of
stock plus a relationship of its holders to the board of directors. The
directors acting in accordance with the wishes of the control holder will
designate a "management slate" of directors at each annual election as
the control holder directs. Where stock is widely distributed, the normal
inertia of shareholders -leads them to vote the "management slate" as a
matter of course. Such control is vulnerable to a proxy fight; but the
organization of an opposition slate, campaign, and proxy fight is expensive
and occurs rarely. This is frequently called "working control." Power to
choose directors and management here is lodged only partly in the stock-
holdings of the minority, but chiefly in a diplomatic alliance between
the minority control holder and the corporate management.
(4) Power to change may be located in a control holder whose stock-
holdings are negligible--possibly nil-but who is in a position to cause
the directors of the corporation to resign seriatim and elect successors of
the control holder's choosing." Here the power is lodged, not at all in
the stock and its vote, but in the personal influence which the control
holder has, for extraneous reasons, over the board of directors.
10 This was the case in Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
11 In Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't), aff'd
mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964), Mr. Roy Cohn held only
3% of the stock of the Lionel Corporation, but he could cause the directors to resign
seriatim, and on his instructions to name directors chosen by the purchaser of this 3%.
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Conceivably a Svengali holding no stock might be in such a position.
Or, perhaps, a gangster group capable of intimidating directors-un-
happily, not an impossible situation in some cases.
The four types of situations run the gamut. Power appertaining to stock
through its vote to power held quasi-politically through relationship with
the corporate management, to power wholly independent of the stock and
its rights. Clearly, at one end of the scale we have power exercised in
accordance with a system set up by corporation law; at the other, power
quite independent of it but still capable of being bought, sold, or quoted.
It may be conceded that the rule developed by Professor Andrews will
be adequate in the first situation and probably in the second. It becomes
hazier when we deal with the third and hardly relevant when applied to
the fourth. Whatever the gamut, two quite different legal considerations
are apparent.
The law of corporations vests management of the corporation's affairs
in its directors.' Directors are obliged to manage corporate affairs for
the benefit of all of the stockholders (due regard being taken of the corpo-
rate contract when there are two or more classes of stock). The stock-
holder's vote is the means of choosing directors. The stockholder may
exercise his vote for personal reasons; " -he may vote on a measure though
he has a personal interest therein separate from other shareholders.14 He
may have a personal interest in choosing a particular slate of directors.
His motives ordinarily are not a matter of inquiry-though that rule is
principally one of convenience. But the directors, however chosen, can
not favor him as against the interest of the corporation. They must act
according to their honest business judgment. The assumption is that a
majority vote is most likely to produce a board which will consider the
interests of the corporation as a whole-a majority indeed have, prima
facie, the greatest interest in producing this result. Precisely because the
stockholder's vote exists for this purpose, he is not allowed to sell it. If,
for example, a group seeking control of management of a corporation,
but unwilling to buy stock, offered to pay every stockholder one dollar
for each vote he cast for their slate, the transaction would be illegal. On
proper showing, an injunction would be obtained against the casting of
votes thus procured; and probably an election determined by such
votes would be set aside. The vote, it thus appears, is a stockholder's
right 'held on a somewhat different basis from the bundle of other rights
12 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701. Substantially similar conditions appear in the
corporation laws of most states.
13 Stevens, supra note 1, § 126, at 567.
14 Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890).
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comprised in a share of stock. It cannot be wholly separated from the
main bundle and exercised for a consideration. Equally it cannot be exer-
cised if part of the transaction includes an arrangement that the directors
for whom the vote is cast will act against the interests of the corporation
or will bind themselves not to use their honest discretion and judgment.
Thus it is not fully true that a stockholder may "vote as he pleases" or
from any motive he chooses. Briefly, he cannot ordinarily bind the di-
rector for whom he votes not to fulfill the duties that director will owe
to the corporation when he assumes office. On the other hand he can sell
his stock to anyone -he pleases and, prima facie, for any price he pleases.
This is why those seeking to purchase control buy stock and not votes.
Concomitantly, directors cannot ordinarily bind themselves to act in
accordance with the instructions of nondirectors-whether or not the
outsider is a dominant stockholder, a Svengali, our gangster-intimidator,
or possibly a former owner of stock like Mr. Cohn in Caplan v. Lionel
Corp.1r He cannot, for example, validly contract to vote as directed to
fill a vacancy in the board of directors and resign when requested. Both
factors are involved when "control" is transferred under the third and
fourth classifications.
It is recognized-as the New York court did in Essex Universal Corp.
v. Yatesl 6-- that there are reasonable limits on this rule. In New York,
a group of stockholders holding sufficient stock to win an election (even
though a minority) may now validly agree to withdraw the directors
they have elected when they transfer their shares to a new owner.'
Whether a director who refused to abide by such an agreement could be
compelled to do so by an equity court is uncertain-I should question it.
But the desiderata are not too important. If the block of stock trans-
ferred can elect a new slate at the next annual meeting, the only point is
whether the old directors must stay in office until that time, or may agree
to drop out at once in favor of a slate named by the incoming group. The
incoming control holder will be able, presumably, to mobilize a majority
of votes for its slate in any case a little later. Not much is accomplished
by insisting on the right of the lame-duck directors to hold over.
This is markedly different from a situation in which a director, theo-
retically bound to act in the best interests of the corporation as a whole,
can be ordered to fill vacancies and can be ordered to resign by an indi-
vidual or group who are not substantial owners of stock but merely hold
15 See note 11 supra.
16 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
17 Ibid; Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 303, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
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an influential position (however attained). The buyer of control in this
latter case is not buying stock-he is buying directors. If he does not
directly bribe the directors to follow his orders and then resign, it is
because he can pay an influential holder to produce the same result. "The
underlying principle is that the management of a corporation is not the
subject of trade and cannot be bought apart from actual stock control
Hence the two separate considerations. The stockholder's vote is a
legitimate adjunct of his shares, designed to produce a single result-a
management dedicated to the interests of the corporation. The buyer of
stock legitimately acquires that right along with his purchase of shares.
Transfer of control by any means other than as an incident of sale of
stock loses this legitimacy. The transferor turns over his capacity to
cause directors to act for reasons other than those of honest business
judgment. This sort of arrangement is contrary to the public policy im-
plicit in the statutory scheme by which corporations are managed.
The difficulty lies with the middle section, especially our third category.
The holder of a quite small block of stock, say ten or fifteen per cent, who
also has a majority of the board of directors with him, controls the proxy
machinery. When the balance of shares are scattered or inert, or have
come to rely on the management, they will normally vote the manage-
ment's slate. The ten per cent 'holder in that case can deliver control;
but he must unite two processes. He can deliver ten per cent of the votes
by selling 'his stock. He can influence his fellow stockholders by presenting
them with a slate of directors chosen by his buyer. Through seriatim
resignations, perhaps, he can put the 'buyer's slate into directorships
before the next election. The price of the shares he sells to his buyer
can, and presumably will, include a consideration for his use of influence
with the old directors as well as for the transfer of his shares. In some
cases the transaction is part legitimate, part not. More accurately, it is
part legitimate-the sale of shares-and may or may not be legitimate
as to the other element-the use of influence-depending on whether the
control seller fulfilled "the fiduciary obligation" referred to by Dean
Stevens. That is, whether he observed 'his duty to exercise 'his power for
the benefit of the corporate group as a whole and not solely for his own
interest.
These considerations require qualification of the rule proposed by
Professor Andrews. 9 When control is transferred for a consideration,
(a) the seller may be selling attributes of his shares which he has a
18 Id. at 303, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
19 See Andrews, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
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perfect right to transfer, but which must be transferred with due con-
sideration for the interest of the corporation as a whole. If the sale is
at differential over market, the problem is whether the seller can collect
the over price, or whether such excess must be shared with his fellow
stockholders; or (b) the control holder may be transferring for a con-
sideration extraneous capacity to direct existing directors to turn over
the management to someone else-that is, selling his capacity to influ-
ence existing directors. This is an attribute 'he has no right to have, and
the existing directors 'have no right to recognize; or (c) the transaction
may contain both elements. Different remedies may be needed.
In the situation presented by (a), other circumstances being absent,
nothing improper has been done. The only question is whether there
should be equitable assignment to the minority shareholders of a portion
of the differential or premium received for the sale of the voting power
along with sale of less than all the stock. In the situation presented by
(b), raw power has been sold without substantial sale of stock; the trans-
action is improper; and, in justice to the shareholders, it ought to be
blocked and perhaps rescission decreed. They are entitled to a manage-
ment chosen by shareholders, not by outsiders. The real difficulty arises
in the case presented by (c)-where legitimate transfer of a minority
of the stock also carries with it control power arising from the relationship
between the holders of the minority block and the corporate management,
and from control of the nomination and proxy machinery.
II
IRRELEVANCE OF "CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY"
One line of analysis of cases arising when control is sold may be briefly
examined and dismissed as irrelevant. This is the hazy theory that oppor-
tunity to sell control of corporate management is a "corporate opportu-
nity" and the control holder is in equity bound to "offer it to the corpora-
tion." This analysis arises, I think, from a misconstruction of the facts
in Perlman v. Feldmann.2 ° There, Newport Steel Corporation (whose
control was sold) had a dependable supply of steel in time of shortage.
Wilport bought thirty-seven per cent of the stock, "working control,"
from Newport's president, Feldmann, and his associates, desiring to
secure the steel supply for its own operations. It paid not quite double
the market price for the stock of Feldmann and 'his associates. There-
upon Perlman brought a derivative action against Feldmann and his
associates, joining Newport as defendant, asking that the differential price
20 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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paid for control be adjudged an asset of Newport, and that it be applied
for equal benefit of all Newport shareholders-presumably through New-
port itself. The claim was upheld. The 'decree, however, did not stop with
adjudging that Newport owned the differential. It directed distribution
of the pro rata share of the differential -directly to the noncontrolling
stockholders of Newport. This accomplished the result desired, though
technically it short circuited Newport. It is sometimes said that this was
not a true case of "sale of control;" that the substance of the transaction
was the sale by Newport to Wilport of its preferred position in securing
steel, though in form a sale of the controlling stock interest; that, in fact,
the real sale was of Newport's capacity to buy steel.
I do not so construe the case. It is true, of course, that when directors
and officers have an opportunity to buy or sell assets which the corpora-
tion should buy or sell for the advantage of the enterprise, and conse-
quently for the advantage of all its shareholders, they are required to
offer the opportunity to the corporation. But, in fact, no such opportunity
was presented to Newport. The buyer did not offer to purchase Newport's
assets and contract position. He offered to buy control of Newport from
a group of stockholders. True, he wanted control because Newport would
then sell him steel-apparently on the same terms it was selling to other
customers. Yet it is 'hard to spell out any opportunity taken advantage of
by Feldmann and -his associates which they or the directors withheld from
Newport. It was a straight case in which stock of Newport was worth
more to the buyers than to anyone else, provided control went with the
stock.
Properly, the court decided that the added differential of value inhered
in the control holders of Newport, but that they, being obliged to exer-
cise their power for the benefit of all stockholders alike, were obligated
to see that all shareholders should receive their pro rata share of the
differential. This could 'have been achieved by directing that the entire
differential be paid into the treasury of Newport, thus increasing the
value of the noncontrolling shares. Or it could be accomplished (as was
done) by short circuiting Newport and giving their pro rata share of
the differential directly to the Newport noncontrolling stockholders as
a sort of dividend. The only "opportunity" here involved was that of
collecting a differential in price over market for the delivery of manage-
ment to the buyer.
The buyer in Feldmann, as in any case in which control is bought, did
intend to manipulate the management of the company. But this is always
the case. It is the normal reason why control is bought. The buyer may
desire to elect himself and his associates to lucrative offices in the corpora-
1965]
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tion. Or he may desire to connect the corporation's business operations
with his own. Or he may desire to merge his acquisition with some other
corporation. In Feldmann he merely desired a dependable seller of steel.
Now there is nothing inherently or even prima fade improper in any
of these situations. Absent suspicious circumstances, there is no reason
to assume that a control buyer desires to manipulate the management to
the disadvantage of the noncontrolling stockholders, though, of course,
this may be the fact.2 Ordinarily, the buyer of control thinks he can do
better with the corporation than the old management, and he intends to
manipulate its personnel and policies toward that end. Absent an intent
to loot or otherwise defraud the corporation, the result should benefit
all stockholders alike. It cannot be said, therefore, that the situation in
Feldmann was peculiar, or different, or distinguishable (save perhaps in
degree) from most cases in which control is acquired. There, as in most
such cases, the only problem arises from the fact that less than all the
shares carry control. Although the management selected by the controlling
shareholders must conduct the corporate affairs for the equal benefit of all
shareholders, the controlling block of shares can attract to themselves a
differential price paid by a buyer to secure capacity to manipulate the
management.
III
TRANSFER OF CONTROL BY CORPORATE VOTE
Control may be shifted from one group to another not only by sale
but also by direct corporate action, though it raises different considera-
tions. The theory that power to choose management of a corporation,
though vested in the shareholders, is an attribute of the corporation, was
raised in Honigman v. Green Giant Co. There, Green Giant had forty-
four outstanding shares of voting stock and nearly 430,000 shares of
non-voting stock, the latter originally issued as a stock split or stock
dividend to the holders of the voting stock and later sold by them to
the public. The two classes of stock were equal in all respects except as
to voting power. Thereafter the management submitted to its stockholders
an amendment to its articles of incorporation giving effect to a plan of
recapitalization. Under it the forty-four voting shares were to be ex-
changed for 44,000 shares of new voting common stock; each nonvoting
share was to receive one share of new voting common. At a duly called
meeting of stockholders (including both classes) 92.3 per cent of the
nonvoting shares voted in favor of the plan, as did all the voting shares.
21 Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (El). Pa. 1940); Gerdes
v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
22 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), affirming 208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961).
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The voting shareholders thereby relinquished control and, as compensa-
tion, their participation (through their stock-holdings) in the assets of the
company was increased from about 0.01 per cent to 9.2 per cent.
A dissenting shareholder sought to set aside the issuance of the pre-
mium shares to the voting stock. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
After observing that a burden did rest upon the directors proposing this
recapitalization to establish its fairness to the non-consenting stock-
holders,2 the court concluded that this burden had been met. It also con-
sidered that great weight should be accorded to the overwhelming stock-
holders' vote in favor of the plan. (It may be noted that the stockholders
voting in favor of such a plan would certainly be estopped from com-
plaining.) The court went further, pointing out that since the previously
nonvoting shares, now accorded a vote, had promptly risen sharply in
market value, a claim that they had been damaged was scarcely in order.
No tinge of fraud or misrepresentation clouded the transaction; conse-
quently the vote to amend the charter and recapitalize on the above basis
was sustained by the trial judge. His decision was affirmed on appeal.
In the decision, note was taken of the fact that an offer had been made
to the holders of the forty-four voting shares of $2,000,000 for their
shares although they represented only 0.01 per cent of the corporate assets.
One wonders what would have happened if the sale had been made, and
the nonvoting shareholders had brought action along the lines of Feld-
mann. The Green Giant decision held only that under the law of Minne-
sota, through due corporate procedure for recapitalization, stockholders
may vote to compensate the holders of voting control for giving it up.
It does not, and does not purport to, settle the question whether the
holders of control can sell their control without liability to account to
the corporation or their fellow stockholders. Undoubtedly the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was not hospitable to the theory that the
price of control could belong to someone other than the voting share-
holders. But that was not the point of the case.
There is, I suggest, a wide difference between sale of control power
to a buyer for a price and corporate action changing voting rights (and
with them location of control) honorably submitted to the vote of all
the shareholders and voted for by substantially all of them.
IV
THE WRONG AND ITs REmEDIES
By its corporation statute, the state grants each corporation capacity
to choose a board of directors for management of its affairs. It directs
23 Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961)1.
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exercise of that capacity through the stockholder's vote. By the certificate
of incorporation, it gives the incorporators power to assign the vote
evenly among all shares outstanding or evenly among all the shares of a
specified class or classes. By statute in most states, and by general doc-
trine, the rights of each share of stock within each class must be iden-
tical.24 It is wholly impractical to require a unanimous vote to elect di-
rectors; consequently in all normal situations a majority is authorized
to elect the directors prevailing over the votes of the minority. Essenti-
ally, this is nothing more than a device to assure continued management
and functioning; it is a corporate power, though exercised by individual
stockholders. It does not authorize or permit a management thus con-
stituted to distinguish between majority and minority shareholders:
management power does not include that privilege. The position of a
majority shareholder, with his capacity to control, is thus not a "property
right" in the same sense as is his right to participate in dividends, or
in liquidation or the like. His control power is really adventitious, a by-
product of the corporate capacity to choose a board of directors by less
than unanimity. This is why the control power-capacity to choose a
management-is a corporate asset, not an individual one.
The same is true, I think, of "minority control," i.e., a minority block
able to mobilize enough additional shares to choose a management by
soliciting their pioxies. The difference is one of degree, though commercial
result may be the same.
The adventitious position of the control holder becomes increasingly
less personal as the controlling minority gets smaller and as the distrib-
ution of stock is wider. The smaller the control block, the less the minority
depends on the vote carried by its block of shares or on its capacity (with-
out aid from the corporation itself) to gain the additional votes needed.
The smaller the controlling minority, the more it must rely on its personal
relation with the board of directors to obtain use of the proxy machinery.
Factually, the controlling minority must, and does, ask the directors of
the corporation to place at its disposal a piece of strictly corporate ma-
chinery-nomination of a slate and sending out proxies asking a favorable
vote on that slate. Where the corporation is sufficiently public, it must
ask them to prepare and circulate the execution and distribution of the
required proxy statement. By now, "control" is a combination of the
individual Tight of the minority 'holder to vote his stock plus the proba-
bility (which is usually overwhelming) that the scattered stock will fol-
24 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 501 (c).
Except, of course, where the corporation law sets up a separate arrangement, as, for
example, authority to issue preferred stock "in series," each series having ,different
characteristics. See Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 125 (1959).
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low the slate recommendation of the directors or "management." The
second element, crucial in this situation, is purely and simply use of a
corporate power; it must 'be exercised for the equal interest of all. If the
minority derives a benefit from its capacity to have such use, that benefit
-the resulting "control" position-results far more from corporate action
than from any attribute of the minority stockholders' ownership.
Finally, where some individual or group has control purely because
of its capacity to cause the corporation to use the proxy machinery and
thereby gain a favorable vote, the control position is purely extraneous.
Any consideration paid for its use is almost indistinguishable from a
bribe paid to induce corporate management to act accordingly.
In the first case, i.e., straight majority control, the power held is legit-
imate; but any price received for it, apart from the value of the stock
without that power, belongs in equity to all the shareholders. The corpo-
rate entity may, but need not necessarily, be used as the conduit through
which the differential may be distributed so that every stockholder gets
his pro Tata share.
The same rule I believe applies to the second case-minority control
where the minority can mobilize the additional needed margin.
In both situations, it would seem that the remedy may be either (1)
recovery of the differential and placing it in the corporate treasury, or (2)
recovery of the differential and directing that it be paid as a distribution
to all the voting shareholders. This may be accomplished directly, as
was done in Feldmann to avoid an unnecessary step, by directing payment
by the control seller of the proper pro rata share to the noncontrolling
shareholders.
Preventively, the remedy suggested by Professor Andrews seems
adequate, though it should be recognized as a remedy rather than a right.
The control seller can be required to exact from his buyer an agreement
to buy all shares offered at the same price as the buyer offers for the
shares of the control seller. And, if the buyer is not prepared to make
that offer, the control seller may exact an agreement that his buyer will
arrange to receive tenders of shares from all stockholders at the price
offered the control seller and will allocate his purchases among all selling
stockholders in proportion to their tenders. Thus, if the control seller
has thirty per cent of the stock-say, 300,000 out of an outstanding
million shares-the control buyer may be required to request tenders
from all stockholders, agreeing that he will buy 300,000 shares and al-
locating 'his purchases pro rata among them. Stockholders who do not
tender may be assumed not to want to sell their stock at the price offered;
in any case, everyone has had his opportunity to receive for part of his
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shares their market value plus their share of the consideration paid for
capacity to choose the board of directors.
And where the controlling minority is "thin," i.e., where it depends
on willingness of the existing board of directors to use the proxy machin-
ery as the minority control holder directs, further scrutiny may be de-
manded. In effect, the control seller in such a case is proposing to enter
the buyer's slate in the next corporate election, relying primarily on the
the inertia of shareholders or perhaps their confidence in the outgoing
management to elect it. At this point, the 'buyer's payment to the minority
control holder is made less for 'his stock than for -his influence. This may
not be objectionable per se-that depends on the circumstances-pro-
vided equal opportunity has been given to shareholders as above. But
the question necessarily arises whether the transaction should be per-
mitted and the burden of showing its fairness rests on the control seller
in case of question. If objectionable, the Temedy could be to enjoin any
payment to the control seller and to require the attempted buyer to sub-
mit his slate of directors at the next election, with appropriate disclosure
of all the relevant circumstances, and to enjoin differential payment
over market for the shares of the control seller and anyone connected
with the management. We are coming unpleasantly close to a situation
where a small minority with an adventitious position is selling-for a
consideration-management action which should not be for sale at all.
A court dealing with an appropriate complaint should have power to de-
termine how the election should be handled.
In the fourth case, i.e., payment to an outsider or a merely nominal
stockholder to cause the corporate management to turn over control to
the buyer, the transaction is simply contrary to public policy and ought
to be enjoined. Rightly or wrongly, the law does require a management
chosen by stockholders and does not allow a corporate management, or
anyone on its behalf, to sell to outsiders the performance of its man-
agerial function. If management considers change of control desirable
in the interests of the corporation, it may go before its stockholders and
say so either by proposing a new slate or (in some cases) by the re-
capitalization route. But neither the management nor anyone on its be-
half may take payment for doing so.
